1	***
2 3	Attorneys for Defendant [DEFENDANT'S NAME]
4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5	*** DISTRICT OF ***
6	*** DIVISION
7	
8 9	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) NO. CR
10 11	Plaintiff,  NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION FOR  V. PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);  [DEFENDANT'S NAME],  MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
12	) AUTHORITIES Defendant.
13	) Hearing Date: [INSERT DATE]) Hearing Time: [INSERT TIME]
14	
15 16 17	TO: UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ***, AND ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY [AUSA'S NAME]:
18 19	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on [DATE], at [TIME], defendant, [NAME],
20	through his counsel of record, [ATTORNEY'S NAME], will bring on for hearing the
21	following motion:
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24	<u>MOTION</u>
25	
26	Defendant, [NAME], through his counsel of record, [ATTORNEY'S NAME],
27	hereby moves this Honorable Court for a reduction in the sentence imposed in this
28	case on [DATE]. This motion is made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and is

1	based upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities, all files and records in
2	this case, and such further argument and evidence as may be presented at the hearing
3	on this motion.
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5	Respectfully submitted,
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8	DATED: February, 2008 By
9	[ATTORNEY S NAME]
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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

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On [DATE], [NAME] was sentenced for [TYPE OF CRACK OFFENSE, I.E., DISTRIBUTION, POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, 6 CONSPIRACY, ETC.], to serve \_\_\_\_\_ months of imprisonment and \_\_\_\_\_ years of 7 8 supervised release. The sentence was imposed under the sentencing guidelines 9 [QUALIFY THIS IF POST-BOOKER], with a base offense level computed under § 2D1.1 of the guidelines for a crack cocaine quantity of [INSERT AMOUNT IN 10 11 YOUR CASE] grams. That base offense level – under the guidelines in effect at the 12 time – was \_\_\_\_\_. Combined with other guidelines factors, it produced a guideline range of \_\_\_\_\_ months, [WHICH 13 WAS THE LOW END/WHICH WAS THE HIGH END/WHICH WAS WITHIN 14 15 THE RANGE/WHICH WAS BELOW THE RANGE/ABOVE THE RANGE,

BASED ON A [DESCRIBE DEPARTURE IF ANY]].

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Subsequent to [NAME]'s sentencing – on November 1, 2007 – an amendment to § 2D1.1 of the guidelines took effect, which, generally, reduces base offense levels for most quantities of crack cocaine by two levels and, specifically, reduces the base offense level for the [INSERT AMOUNT IN YOUR CASE] gram quantity of crack cocaine in this case by two levels, to \_\_\_\_\_. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. This amendment was adopted in response to studies which raise grave doubts about the fairness and rationale of the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio incorporated into the sentencing guidelines. See generally United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (May 2007) (hereinafter "2007 Sentencing

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Commission Report"); United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (May 2002); United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (April 1997); United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (Feb. 1995). See also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 568-69 (2007) (discussing history of crack cocaine guideline and various Sentencing Commission reports). Yet the amendment is only a partial response, as the Sentencing Commission itself recognized. The Commission explained:

The Commission, however, views the amendment only as a partial remedy to some of the problems associated with the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio. It is neither a permanent nor a complete solution to these problems. Any comprehensive solution requires appropriate legislative action by Congress. It is the Commission's firm desire that this report will facilitate prompt congressional action addressing the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio.

2007 Sentencing Commission Report, supra, at 10.

Subsequent to the effective date of this amendment to § 2D1.1, the Sentencing Commission considered whether to make the amendment retroactive under the authority created by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). It took that action on December 11, 2007, by including this amendment in the list of retroactive amendments in § 1B1.10 of the guidelines. *See* 73 Fed. Reg. 217-01 (2008). Based on this retroactivity, the statutory authority underlying it, and the Supreme Court's intervening [ONLY IF ALL OF FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFTER SENTENCING] decisions in *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); *Rita v. United States*, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007);

1	Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); and Kimbrough v. United States, supra,
2	[NAME] brings this motion to reduce his sentence.
3	
4	II.
5	<u>ARGUMENT</u>
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7	A. [NAME]'S OFFENSE LEVEL SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM TO
8	, AND THE GUIDELINE RANGE REDUCED FROM TO
9	BASED ON THE AMENDMENT TO § 2D1.1.
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11	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides as follows:
12	[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
13	imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
14	been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
15	994(o), upon motion of the defendant the court may reduce the
16	term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in
17	section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a
18	reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
19	the Sentencing Commission.
20	
21	Section 1B1.10 is the guidelines policy statement which implements 18 U.S.C.
22	§ 3582(c)(2). Subsection (c) of that policy statement lists amendments that are
23	covered by the policy statement. And one of the amendments which is listed is
24	amendment 711 to the guidelines. <sup>1</sup> That is the amendment which reduced the base
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26	This amendment is not listed in the November 1, 2007 Guidelines Manual
27	because the Sentencing Commission vote making it retroactive was on December 11, 2007. <i>See</i> United States Sentencing Commission News Release dated December 11,
28	5

1	offense level for crack cocaine offenses. See U.S.S.G., App. C, § 711.
2	
3	Application of this amendment to the crack cocaine guideline in the present
4	case results in a decrease of the base offense level from to, a decrease in
5	the total offense level from to, and a decrease in the resulting guideline
6	range from to [THEN GO THROUGH CALCULATIONS TO
7	ESTABLISH THIS AND ALSO DISCUSS ANY OTHER ISSUES THAT ARE
8	RELEVANT SUCH AS MANDATORY MINIMUMS THAT LIMIT REDUCTION,
9	WHETHER CAN REOPEN QUESTION OF SAFETY VALVE, ETC.].
10	
11	B. THE COURT SHOULD REDUCE [NAME]'S SENTENCE [TO [INSERT
12	SPECIFIC AMOUNT]/A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT/SOME OTHER
13	CHARACTERIZATION YOU CHOOSE].
14	
15	Based on the amendment to § 2D1.1, the Court should significantly reduce
16	[NAME]'s sentence. It follows from the discussion in the preceding section that the
17	amendment alone justifies a reduction of [INSERT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
18	GUIDELINE RANGES] months.
19	
20	[THIS PARAGRAPH ONLY IF ORIGINAL SENTENCING PRE-BOOKER,
21	BUT CONSIDER ADAPTING HICKS AND KIMBROUGH DISCUSSION EVEN
22	IF POST-BOOKER.] The Court should not stop there, however. At the time of
23	[NAME]'s original sentence, the Court was required to treat the guidelines as
24	mandatory, under the controlling law at that time. Since then, the Supreme Court has
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<ul><li>26</li><li>27</li></ul>	2007, available at <a href="http://www.USSG.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm">http://www.USSG.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm</a> . See also 73 Fed. Reg. 217-01 (2008).

held the guidelines in their mandatory form are unconstitutional and – through severing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) – made them "effectively advisory." *Booker*, 543 U.S. at \_\_\_\_\_\_. *Booker* and subsequent Supreme Court cases clarifying it – namely, *Rita v. United States, supra*; *Gall v. United States, supra*; and *Kimbrough v. United States, supra* – have created a brave new world, in which the guidelines are but one of several factors to be considered under § 3553(a). What the Supreme Court has described as the "overarching provision" in § 3553(a) is the requirement that courts "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to accomplish the goals of sentencing." *Kimbrough*, 128 S. Ct. at 570.

Booker and its progeny apply to the imposition of a new sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), moreover. The Ninth Circuit considered this question in *United States v. Hicks*, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) and held, put most succinctly, that "Booker applies to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings." *Hicks*, 472 F.3d at 1169. As the court explained in more depth:

mandatory system is no longer an open choice." Although the

mandatory guideline system, *Booker* stressed that this was not an

Court acknowledged that Congress had intended to create a

option: "[W]e repeat, given today's constitutional holding, [a

mandatory Guideline regime] is not a choice that remains open

... [W]e have concluded that today's holding is fundamentally

inconsistent with the judge-based sentencing system that Congress

enacted into law." The Court never qualified this statement, and

never suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that the mandatory

*Booker* explicitly stated that, "as by now should be clear, [a]

Guideline regime survived in any context.

In fact, the Court emphasized that the guidelines could not be construed as mandatory in one context and advisory in another. When the government suggested, in *Booker*, that the Guidelines be considered advisory in certain, constitutionally-compelled cases, but mandatory in others, the Court quickly dismissed this notion, stating, "we do not see how it is possible to leave the Guidelines as binding in other cases. . . . [W]e believe that Congress would not have authorized a mandatory system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in others, given the administrative complexities that such a system would create." In short, Booker expressly rejected the idea that the Guidelines might be advisory in certain contexts, but not in others, and Congress has done nothing to undermine this conclusion. Because the "mandatory system is no longer an open choice," district courts are necessarily endowed with the discretion to depart from the Guidelines when issuing new sentences under § 3582(c)(2).

Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1170 (citations omitted).

Here, there are a number of non-guidelines factors that justify a sentence below even the new guideline range. [EITHER HERE OR BELOW, INSERT ARGUMENT ABOUT ANY § 3553(a) FACTORS AND *BOOKER/GALL/KIMBROUGH*]

[EITHER CONTINUATION OF LAST TEXT SENTENCE ABOVE OR NEW PARAGRAPH] One [OR ANOTHER?] consideration to which the Court should give particular weight is a consideration expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in *Kimbrough v. United States, supra* as a ground for not following the guidelines – the

questionable provenance of the crack/powder ratio. As the Government itself acknowledged in *Kimbrough*, "the Guidelines 'are now advisory' and . . . , as a general matter, 'courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines." *Kimbrough*, 128 S. Ct. at 570 (quoting Brief for United States 16). While the government then tried to distinguish policy disagreement with the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio from other policy disagreements, the Supreme Court squarely rejected that argument. *See Kimbrough*, 128 S. Ct. at 570-74.

Indeed, the Court suggested that policy disagreement in this area was even *more* defensible than in other areas. It noted that "in the ordinary case, the Commission's recommendation of a sentence will 'reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives,' *id.* at 574 (quoting *Rita*, 127 S. Ct. at 2465), and so "closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines, based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range 'fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations' even in a mine-run case." *Kimbrough*, 128 S. Ct. at 575. The Court then explained that this was not the case with the crack cocaine guidelines, however.

The crack cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion

for elaborative discussion of this matter because those Guidelines

do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic

cocaine offenses, as we earlier noted, the Commission looked to

the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not

take account of "empirical data and national experience." Indeed,

the Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity

institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack

produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, *i.e.*, sentences for crack cocaine offenses "greater than the necessary" in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Given all this, it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence "greater than necessary" to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, *even in a mine-run case*.

Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

These concerns are only partially assuaged by the recent amendment reducing crack cocaine offense levels, moreover. This also was recognized by the Supreme Court in *Kimbrough*:

This modest amendment yields sentences for crack offenses between two and five times longer than sentences for equal amounts of powder. (Citation and footnote omitted.) Describing the amendment as "only . . . a partial remedy" for the problems generated by the crack/powder disparity, the Commission noted that "[\a]ny comprehensive solution requires appropriate legislative action by Congress."

*Kimbrough*, 128 S. Ct. at 569 (quoting 2007 Sentencing Commission Report, *supra* pp. 3-4 at 10). *Kimbrough*'s rationale for varying from the crack guidelines therefore remains even after the new guideline is applied.

[CONSIDER APPLYING THIS *KIMBROUGH* ARGUMENT TO YOUR SPECIFIC CASE IN SOME WAY; FOR EXAMPLE, BY POINTING OUT WHAT SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN IF IT WAS JUST POWDER]

1	[INSERT ANY ARGUMENT ABOUT ANY § 3553(a) FACTORS AND
2	BOOKER/GALL/KIMBROUGH NOT ALREADY INSERTED ABOVE]
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4	III.
5	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
6	
7	The Court should adjust [NAME]'s sentencing guideline range downward to
8	It should then [RECOMMEND SPECIFIC SENTENCE AND/OR MORE
9	GENERAL URGING FOR LOWER SENTENCE, IF DON'T WANT TO
10	RECOMMEND SPECIFIC SENTENCE].
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12	Respectfully submitted,
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14	DATED: February, 2008 By[ATTORNEY'S NAME]
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