In the consolidated cases Brown v. United States, No. 22-6389 (May 23, 2024), and Jackson v. United States, No. 22-6640 (May 23, 2024), opinion here, the Supreme Court held that a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of the state conviction. The 6 to 3 opinion, written by Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, begins like this:
These cases concern the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to state drug convictions that occurred before recent technical amendments to the federal drug schedules. ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants who are convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm and have a criminal history that is thought to demonstrate a propensity for violence. These defendants are subject to ACCA’s enhanced penalty if, among other things, they have “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). For a state crime to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment, and it must “involv[e] . . . a controlled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” (CSA). §§924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii). The CSA, in turn, includes five schedules of controlled substances and provides that these schedules must be updated each year by the Attorney General. 84 Stat. 1245, 1247, 21 U. S. C. §§811, 812.
The two cases now before us present the question whether a state crime constitutes a “serious drug offense” if it involved a drug that was on the federal schedules when the defendant possessed or trafficked in it but was later removed. We hold that such an offense qualifies.
Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch joined as to parts I, II, III:
The Court maintains that, “[s]tanding alone,” the text of 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) “does not definitively answer” the question presented in these cases. Ante, at 7. Instead, says the majority, we must look beyond the text to precedent, statutory context, and purpose—which apparently converge to persuade the majority that §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires sentencing courts to apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of a defendant’s prior state drug conviction when determining the applicability of the 15-year mandatory minimum in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). But the relevant text does definitively answer the question presented here. And it establishes that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearms offense that triggers ACCA’s potential application. Nothing else—not precedent, context, or purpose—requires a different result. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
(empasis added). The merits briefing is available on the Supreme Court's website here (Brown) and here (Jackson).